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1 Introduction
Audits are pervasive in government, corporations and other institutions. The economics
literature usually considers them as neutral information extraction tools to monitor rule
compliance (Becker, 1968). In practice however, the details of how the audits are designed
and implemented may play an important role, and the incentives they create may be more
complex than a simple probability of detection. This paper looks into the black box of
the audit process and investigates the effects of audits on public procurement practices
in Chile. We find that the audit design can create incentives that go against the goals of
the national public procurement legislation that the audits are intended to enforce.
In particular, since audits typically verify rule compliance, more complex processes
with more steps tend to lead to more checks during an audit. If agents run the risk
of making a mistake in any given step of the process, procedures involving more steps
will mechanically lead to a higher probability of being found to be incompliant. Unless
penalties for infractions are lower for processes involving more steps, audits will lead to
higher expected costs of using more complex processes. This distortionary incentive can
go counter to underlying policy goals, unless the regulator actually intends to discourage
the more complex process. In many cases however, the reverse is true.
In the case of public procurement, many governments promote the use of public
auctions in place of less transparent and less competitive direct contracting. The emphasis
on auctions is consistent with both theory and evidence suggesting that auctions tend to
increase competitiveness of procurement (e.g. Bulow and Klemperer, 1996; Lalive et al.,
2015; Litschig and Zamboni, 2016). However, auctions are also much more complex and
involve many more steps and rules than direct contracting procedures.
We empirically analyze these issues in the context of public procurement contracting
in Chile. Public procurement represents an important share of the economy (about 12.1%
of GDP and 29% of total general government expenditures in the OECD (OECD, 2015)),
and the government is the largest buyer in many countries. Free and fair competition
for government contracts plays a key role both for the quality and cost of government
purchases, and to create a level-playing field for new entrepreneurs and suppliers, who
can benefit from such contracts (Ferraz et al., 2016; Barrot and Nanda, 2016). Most
governments therefore monitor compliance with public procurement regulation through
external auditing by an independent comptroller agency.
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Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design (RDD), we find that external audits of
public procurement in 2011-2012 lead to a sizeable decrease in the use of auctions and
a corresponding increase of direct contracting - a result which surprised representatives
of the auditing agency and goes against the overall goals of the procurement regulation.
The shift leads to a sizeable reduction in competitiveness measured by the number of
competing suppliers. There is a particularly strong shift away from auctions with more
than 3 bidders and towards the type of direct contracts that only require one quote.
Given that officers may underuse auctions, the national procurement legislation requires
an explicit justification for the use of direct contracting. The justification that is known
to be particularly flexible is “emergency”.1 We find that the strongest increase in direct
contracting is through this emergency justification, accounting for almost half of the
overall effect.
In order to study the specifics of the auditing process and understand what mech-
anism might lead to this result, we worked with the Comptroller Agency to conduct
additional audits. The audit protocols were structured in the same way as any standard
procurement audit, except that more information was collected in the process. While
auditors in Chile typically only record detected infractions, in these additional audits the
auditors also recorded information on checks that were conducted where no infractions
were found, as well as information about which purchases were audited.
Results from these additional audits reveal that contracts made through auctions
undergo about 2.5 times as many checks and lead to twice as many detected infractions
than contracts made through direct contracting. These figures remain essentially un-
changed when controlling for contract characteristics such as the amount and type of
purchase. Consistent with the hypothesis that this is driven by the difference in the con-
tract awarding modality, these differences arise almost exclusively from aspects related to
the contract creation stage, rather from aspects related to the execution of contracts. We
also investigate the alternative hypothesis that after having been audited, entities become
less adherent to procurement rules because of low likelihood of being audited twice in a
row. If anything however, there is an increase in the audit probability in the year follow-
ing an audit. And even if there had been a temporary reduction in the subsequent audit
probability, current contracts could still be audited during audits several years later.
We complement these findings with a subgroup analysis to shed further light on the
1For this reason, “emergency” is the only justification for which the regulation includes a personal
liability by the head of the entity in case of overuse (Procurement Law art.8, letter c).
3
mechanisms. For this, we develop a novel empirical approach to overcome a well-known
challenge in regression discontinuity designs: how to conduct valid subgroup analyses
holding other observables constant. Using propensity score weighting in the spirit of
Abadie (2005), we weight the sample to make the subgroups similar to each other in
terms of other covariates. Analyzing the differential treatment effect in the weighted
sample helps isolating the difference due to the subgroup characteristic of interest from
other observable dimensions.2
One subgroup of interest in our case are entities with a high share of direct contract
purchases in the pre-audit period vs. those with a low share. Entities with a high
share of direct contracts may be more likely to learn that abuse of direct contracting
is rarely detected or punished and therefore to respond more strongly. Weighting on
the propensity score essentially eliminates the originally large covariate imbalances across
these subgroups. While the estimated impact of the audit is indeed larger for entities
with a high pre-treatment share of direct-contracts compared to those with below-median
use of direct contracts, this difference is not statistically significant.
In order to conduct these analyses, the paper combines detailed administrative data
on public purchases from the Chilean public procurement agency (“ChileCompra”) with
both historical and newly collected auditing data of the Comptroller Agency. ChileCom-
pra, provided information on all procurement processes conducted on their platform. The
Comptroller Agency (“Contralor´ıa General de la Repu´blica”) provided data on audits as
well as on a scoring rule and scores used in the selection of entities to be audited during
2011-2012, which allow us to implement the RDD.
Our paper contributes to multiple strands of literature. First, it presents to the
best of our knowledge the first causally identified analysis of the impact of an audit on
subsequent procurement behavior. The most closely related paper by Ferraz et al. (2017)
finds that audits reduce future corruption among Brazilian local governments. In the case
of taxes, the evidence on impacts of audits is mixed. DeBacker et al. (2015a) find that
U.S. firms reduce tax payments following an audit, while DeBacker et al. (2015b) and
Kleven et al. (2011) find an increase in tax payments for the case of the individual income
tax in the U.S. and Denmark respectively. Our results also complement previous studies
that analyze an increase in audit risk on corruption in road construction (Olken, 2007)
and public procurement (Litschig and Zamboni, 2016), tax evasion (e.g. Kleven et al.,
2We developed a Stata command that implements this approach, rddsga, which is available for down-
load in the Stata repository.
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2011; Pomeranz, 2015) or compliance with environmental regulation (Duflo et al., 2014).
Second, our paper highlights that when governments scrutinize certain processes more
carefully, they may inadvertently discourage the use of these processes altogether. These
findings are consistent with a number of papers showing that in the face of increased
scrutiny, agents substitute activities to less well monitored margins (e.g. Olken, 2007;
Carrillo et al., 2017; Niehaus and Sukhtankar, 2013; Yang, 2008). Our results indicate
that such substitution may not only happen if certain activities are explicitly subject to
higher audit probabilities than others, but can also result from differences in the specific
audit protocol applied to different activities.
Third, our paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature on public procurement
design by providing new insights into the factors that can affect the choice of procurement
modality. The finding that the shift towards direct contracting reduces the competitive-
ness in terms of the number of involved suppliers is consistent with Lalive et al. (2015)
who find that auctions lead to lower prices and higher quality than direct contracting in
the case of rail services in Germany. Banerjee et al. (2015) find that increased competition
through additional suppliers reduced costs without sacrificing quality of local public rice
procurement in Indonesia. The way in which procurement contracts are awarded has also
been found to impact quality-adjusted prices by Bandiera et al. (2009) for the case of
framework agreements and by Lewis-Faupel et al. (2016) for the case of e-procurement.
These results also relate to recent empirical work that investigates how aspects of auction
design affect efficiency in public procurement (e.g. Tran, 2010; Decarolis, 2014; Coviello
and Mariniello, 2014; Coviello et al., 2015).
Finally, our finding that the role of audits goes beyond a simple information extraction
tool and that it is key to think carefully about (unintended) incentives of audit design
are consistent with Duflo (2017) which stresses the importance of studying the details of
policy implementation. Diving into the “plumbing” details of policy design often reveals
a much more nuanced structure of incentives.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional
background on public procurement and on external audits of public entities in Chile.
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 shows
the main results and Section 6 presents analyses of underlying mechanisms. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
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2 Background
2.1 Public Procurement in Chile
ChileCompra is the government agency in charge of managing the public procurement
system and the online platform on which most public procurement in Chile takes place.3
Since its inception in 2003, the platform has grown to serve practically all public entities
in Chile, with more than 100,000 firms supplying goods and services. During our study
period, purchases conducted through the ChileCompra platform represented about 4% of
GDP (ChileCompra, 2013).4 Contralor´ıa is the National Comptroller Agency in charge
of monitoring all public entities, including ministries, municipalities, public services, and
state-owned enterprises. Contralor´ıa’s primary monitoring activity consists of audits of
different types of activities by public entities.
There are four main purchasing modalities in Chile, each with distinct implications for
the extent of transparency and competitiveness. The two key modalities analyzed in this
paper are auctions and direct contracting. Historically, almost all purchases were made
through direct contracting, but over recent years ChileCompra has succeeded in moving
a large share of purchases to be done through auctions. All else equal, public auctions
are preferred by the regulation because of their higher transparency and competition
compared to direct contracting. For such auctions, all information about the bidding
process is publicly available online and selection criteria are specified explicitly and ex-
ante by the purchasing entity. The mean number of bidders in auctions in our study
sample is around 10 (see Table 1).
In order to use direct contracting, public entities need to provide a justification,
explaining and documenting the need to do so. Possible justifications include cases in
which only one supplier exists, emergencies, cases in which organizing an auction would
represent a disproportionate cost, or cases where the total sum is below about 700 USD.5
Depending on the type of justification for using direct contracting, procurement officers
are required to get one or three quotes from suppliers. About 60% of direct contracts in
3There are a few exceptions for transacting outside the platform, such as for purchases by the armed
forces.
4Large public works such as the construction of an airport or highway are not included in the Chile-
Compra procurement system and are handled by a different agency.
5The specific threshold is 10 UTM (Unidad Tributaria Mensual, an inflation-adjusted Chilean unit of
account). In December 2011, 10 UTM were approximately 750 USD.
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our study sample require only 1 quote, while 40% require 3 quotes, leading to an average
number of quotes of 1.8 for direct contracts.
For products that are used by many public entities, such as office supplies, Chile-
Compra established framework agreements, in which entities can simply order products
for a pre-established price from a website, called the “procurement supermarket”. When
a product is available in the “supermarket”, the entity does not need to resort to the
organization of an auction nor to direct contracting. In our study period, about 16%
of the value of purchases was made through framework agreements. Finally, small pur-
chases below about 200 USD can be made outside of the electronic procurement system
altogether (about 0.4% of the total value of purchases).
2.2 Audit Selection Process
During our 2011-2012 study period, the Comptroller Agency selected entities for the
most common type of audit using a scoring system.6 In this system, the audit probability
depends on an entity’s “relative importance score”. This score is calculated based on
measures such as the entity’s budget size, transfers to the private sector, etc. Public
entities are ranked according to their relative importance score. Within each internal
control department of the Comptroller Agency, entities are then divided into three groups:
high, medium, low relative importance. The classification is done separately each year,
so an entity can be in different cells in different years. Content of the factors going into
the scoring rule, as well as even the existence of such a score were not publicly known and
maintained secret within a small team at the central control office. Cutoffs are neither
known ex-ante nor published ex-post, making manipulation around the cutoffs by entities
virtually impossible.
For entities that the Comptroller Agency considers to be of medium risk for non-
compliance,7 the audit probability depends on their relative importance classification.
Within the group of medium risk entities, those with high relative importance have a high
audit probability, those with low relative importance have a low audit probability, and
for those with medium relative importance it depends on the available auditing resources.
(For entities classified as high risk, the audit probability is generally high, and for entities
6These audits involve a general examination of different areas of the entity’s operations, which includes
a strong focus on the entity’s procurements.
7The risk classification includes elements such as low compliance in previous audits, complaints from
civil society and government priorities. It also varies from year to year and is not publicly known.
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classified as low risk, it is generally low, independent of the relative importance score).
We can therefore use the cutoffs between high and medium, and between medium and
low relative importance score for an RD design among the entities generally classified as
medium risk. There are 720 and 953 medium risk entities in 2011 and 2012 respectively,
which represents 59% and 63% of the total number of entities.
The scores and cutoffs are determined separately within 91 strata, which are defined
by year, responsible control department (“UCE”) and type of entity (national, regional
or municipal). The reason for this is that auditors and corresponding auditing manpower
are predetermined at the stratum level. Within each stratum, the range of values for each
score is divided into three equally-sized parts that determine the cutoffs. For example, if
the score ranges from 20 to 80, the cutoff between low and medium would be at 40 and
the cutoff between medium and high would be at 60.
In addition to the relative importance score, other more subjective factors are involved
in the determination of which entities get audited in a specific year. So there is not a
one-to-one determination from an entity’s classification to whether it is audited. However,
there is a significant discontinuity in the probability of being audited around the cutoff.
Small differences in the relative importance score can affect the entity’s probability of
being audited. This allows us to use fuzzy regression discontinuity analysis. In our data,
there are two sizeable and significant discontinuities in the audit probability. In 2011, the
discontinuity in the probability of audit occurs between low and medium levels of relative
importance, while in 2012, it occurs between medium and high importance. We therefore
focus our analysis on entities classified as medium risk and in the vicinity of the relevant
discontinuity for each year.8
3 Data
We combine administrative data from the procurement agency ChileCompra’s online pro-
curement platform with audit data from the Comptroller Agency.9 To complement this
data, we worked with the Comptroller Agency to conduct additional audits to investigate
what happens during procurement audits and shed light on the mechanisms underlying
the shift from the use of auctions towards direct contracting.
8Including additional smaller discontinuities would lead to weak instrument problems (Feir et al.,
2016).
9Our online data Appendix explains the construction of the dataset in detail.
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3.1 Data from the Procurement Agency ChileCompra
The ChileCompra data include information on all purchase orders conducted on the on-
line platform. Each auction or direct contract results in one or several purchase orders.
For each purchase order, we have data on the purchasing entity, the purchase modality
(auction, direct contract, or online supermarket), date of the purchase, product code of
each item in the order (up to 8-digit codes), verbal description of each item, name of the
seller and amount of the purchase.
Table 1 Panel A presents summary statistics for the universe of purchase orders issued
by medium risk public entities during our estimation period of 2011-2012. Auctions make
up about 51% of purchase orders and 66% of dollars spent. Direct contracts make up
around 14% of purchase orders and 17% of dollars spent. Framework agreements represent
almost 28% of purchase orders, but only 16% of total dollars spent. This is because
framework agreements are most commonly used for relatively low-cost purchases, such
as office supplies and cleaning materials. About half a percent of the value of purchases
conducted through the platform was in the category of small purchases, for which use of
the electronic procurement platform is optional. When we focus on public entities in our
estimation sample (i.e., those relatively close to the cutoff of the regression discontinuity
design) the numbers are quite similar (see Panel B).
In addition to the ChileCompra purchase order data, we also analyze a separate
auctions database with information on the number of bidders in each auction. We use
this information to analyze the share of purchases originating from auctions with high or
low numbers of bidders.
3.2 Data from the Comptroller Agency Contralor´ıa
Data on Entities and RDD Audits
The Comptroller Agency provided data both on characteristics of the public entities in
the study, the audits, and the relative importance score used for the RDD. Information
about the entities includes the following: the entity type (national, regional or municipal
entity), the responsible control department in charge of auditing a given entity,10 the score
10In 2011-2012 there were 23 control departments (Unidades de Control Externo, UCE): one for each
of the fourteen non-metropolitan regions of Chile, one for municipalities and eight related to specific
ministries.
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and cutoff of the relative importance indicator and the level of the risk classification. We
also construct a variable of political affiliation of each entity based on public information
from the Chilean Electoral Service (Chilean Electoral Service, 2014) (right wing coalition,
left wing coalition, independent).11
Data on the audits include which entities were audited and the audits’ start and end
date. In the estimation sample during 2011-2012, 260 entities were audited out of a total
of 1002.
Additional Audits
In order to analyze what happens in detail during an audit, the Comptroller Agency
agreed to undertake a number of additional audits. These audits were conducted in the
same way as typical public procurement audits, with the key difference that auditors
recorded more information than usual. Usually, auditors only report detected infractions,
but not which purchases were audited and which types of checks were conducted. In these
additional audits, auditors recorded which contracts were audited and which checks were
being conducted, in addition to any detected infractions. This information was recorded at
the purchase level. In regular audits, findings from several purchases are usually grouped
together, so that it is not possible to study audit results by procurement modality.
The additional information recorded in these audits allows us to examine differences
in the way auctions and direct contracts are audited, and to compare the frequency of
detected infractions by purchase modality. For each purchase, we are able to see how
many checks were carried out, and in how many of these checks infractions were found.
In addition, auditors record whether the seriousness and type of the detected infraction
warrant a follow-up visit (to verify whether the entity has introduced corrective measures)
or an investigation (which can lead to punitive legal action).
While the audits examined in the RDD analysis happened 3-4 years earlier than
these additional audits, there had been no substantive changes in the way the Comptroller
Agency executes such audits. The audits analyzed with the RDD happened in 2011-2012
and the additional audits were implemented in 2015 (see Figure 1 for a timeline). The
additional audits took place in two waves, half of them starting in July and the other
11National and regional entities are assigned to the right-wing coalition since they are part of the
right-wing coalition government that was in office at the national level at that time. The affiliation of
municipal entities is assigned according to the affiliation of the mayor at the time.
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half in September. 18 entities were selected randomly within strata that had remaining
auditing capacity. In each entity, Contraloria audited three purchases of goods and three
purchases of services, for a total of 108. Purchases were selected mainly based on their
value in order to justify the cost of auditing them. Similar to the study sample described in
Table 1, here too about a third of the audited purchases originated from direct contracts,
while the other two thirds stemmed from auctions.
The audit protocol involved 95 different checks, most of which referred to aspects
of either the contract creation or the contract execution stage.12 The contract creation
stage includes everything that precedes contract signing, such as choosing the procurement
modality, writing the specifications for auctions, requesting quotes for direct contracts,
evaluating the bids or offers, etc. The contract execution stage refers to all activities
following contract awarding, such as the timing of delivery, quality of the product or
service, and whether contract specifications are met, etc.13 This allows us to analyze the
audit results both by type of purchase modality and by type of check.
4 Empirical Strategy
4.1 Identification Strategy for the RDD
Based on the audit-selection process described in 2.2, we can use a fuzzy regression dis-
continuity design to estimate the impact of the audits. As described above, within the
group of medium risk entities, the audit probability is affected by which category of rel-
ative importance the entity falls in. Relative importance is determined by a continuous
score with clear cutoffs. This allows us to use an RDD by comparing entities directly
above and directly below the thresholds separating high from medium or medium from
low relative importance. The intuition behind this RDD is that those directly below and
above a relative importance threshold have practically the same relative importance. At
the same time, the probability of being audited jumps discontinuously.
As discussed above, the cutoffs are determined separately in each stratum. In order
12These audits were also used to pilot an intervention in which the Comptroller Agency varied what
letters they sent to the entities to inform them that they would be audited on the contract creation or
creation and execution stages. The audit protocol was independent of the letter, and our analysis in this
paper exploits variation within entities rather than across.
13Appendix B shows the audit protocol with its 95 checks, and their classification according to whether
they relate to the creation or the execution stage.
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to be able to pool the data for the analysis across the different strata, we look at the
normalized score of each entity, following the approach of prior literature (e.g. Hastings et
al., 2014; Kaufmann et al., 2013; Pop-Eleches and Urquiola, 2013). This involves setting
the cutoff for each stratum to zero, so that the normalized score represents the distance
from the cutoff.
Formally, let Yij denote an outcome for public entity i in stratum j; Dij the indicator
for being audited; Xij the relative importance score normalized with respect to cutoff cj,
I[Xij ≥ 0] an indicator for an importance score above the cutoff in stratum j; τ the effect
of an audit; pi the effect of crossing the cutoff on the audit probability; f(Xij) and g(Xij)
polynomials in the importance score. Additionally, Sj is a full set of stratum dummies,
and Wij is a vector of entity characteristics, including past outcomes. Finally, Uij and Vij
capture the error terms.
The model is then as follows:
Yij = τDij + f(Xij) + Sj + γWij + Uij (1)
Dij = piI[Xij ≥ 0] + g(Xij) + Sj + θWij + Vij (2)
The IV estimator using I[Xij ≥ 0] as an instrument for Dij identifies the effect of an
audit τ under two main assumptions. The first is the continuity of E[Uij|Xij]. Intuitively,
this requires that there are no other unobserved factors that change discontinuously at the
relevant cutoffs. As shown in Lee and Lemieux (2010), a sufficient condition for continuity
of unobservables is that the density of the variable determining treatment assignment is
continuous.
In practice, this is fulfilled if there is no precise manipulation of entities to be on
one side or the other of the cutoff. This is plausible, because public entities have at most
imprecise control over their value of the relative importance score. Both the fact that the
control department of the Comptroller Agency makes such a score and the details of how
it is calculated are unknown to the public entities. In addition, the cutoffs are determined
after the indicators comprising the relative importance index have been calculated, so
nobody knows where the cutoffs are going to be at the time the indicators are calculated.
While this assumption is not directly testable, it has testable implications, which we
examine using the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) in Section 5.1 below.
The second assumption is the exclusion restriction, i.e., the assumption that crossing
12
the cutoff affects outcomes only through the increased audit probability, not through
other channels. In our case, it is very unlikely that any other changes are happening at
that threshold, given that this is an internal score of the central control department, not
shared with any other areas of the Comptroller Agency, and different for every stratum
and in every year.
4.2 Estimation Approach for the RDD
During our study period from 2011-2012, the normalized distance to the cutoff ranges
from −62.5 to 38.9. However, observations that are very far from the cutoff are not very
informative to estimate the RD-gap at the cutoff. Following Hahn, Todd and Van der
Klaauw (2001) and Imbens and Lemieux (2008), we estimate local linear regressions in
samples around the cutoffs. In accordance with Lee and Lemieux (2010), we also use a
quadratic specification in a larger bandwidth. Based on visual inspection, the linear and
quadratic specifications use bandwidths of ±4 and ±10, respectively. We use OLS with a
rectangular kernel, which in effect amounts to giving higher weight to observations closer
to a given cutoff cj. In addition, we present results from outcome-specific bandwidths
that are Mean Square Error (MSE)-optimal as proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) as well as the bias-corrected estimates and robust standard errors proposed by
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). Throughout the paper, we focus on reduced
form estimates from Equation (4) below in order to maintain a close correspondence with
the graphical reduced form evidence.
In particular, our linear specification for observations within a distance h of the cutoff
between levels of relative importance within a given stratum is as follows:
Dij = piI[Xij ≥ 0] + ρ0 + ρ1Xij + ρ2Xij × I[Xij ≥ 0] + Sj + γWij + Vij (3)
Yij = δI[Xij ≥ 0] + β0 + β1Xij + β2Xij × I[Xij ≥ 0] + Sj + θWij + Uij (4)
where δ = τ × pi, Xij, Dij, Yij, Sj, Wij, Vij, and Uij are as in Section 4.1.
We present specifications both with and without control variables. The control vari-
ables (Wij) included are: 1) the shares of purchases the entity made through auctions
and through direct contracting one and two years prior to the treatment year; 2) the log
(+1) of the total amount purchased by the entity in dollars one and two years prior to
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the treatment year; 3) a dummy for being audited one year prior to the treatment;14 and
4) dummies for the entities’ political affiliation. In order to account for potential common
shocks, we cluster the analysis at the stratum level.
4.3 New Approach to Subgroup Analysis in RDD
In order to investigate which hypotheses are supported by data, researchers often ap-
ply subgroup analyses to study the differential treatment effect of a certain type in the
population. However, since subgroups may differ from each other on various dimensions,
researchers would often like to compare two subgroups while holding other characteristics
constant.
As an example, one subgroup of interest in our case are entities with a high share of
direct contract purchases in the pre-audit period (let’s call that group Gi=1) vs. those
with a low share (Gi=0). The reasoning is that if procurement officers learn during the
audit that abuse of direct contracting justifications is not detected or punished, one might
expect entities with more direct contracts to be more likely to have the opportunity to
learn this and therefore to respond more strongly to the audit. However, entities with a
high share of direct contracts differ from those with a low share in other ways. They tend
to be larger, more likely to be national as opposed to municipal and more likely to have
been previously audited. The goal is to find a way to analyze the different responses to
the audit by entities with a high vs low pre-treatment auction share, while holding such
other characteristics constant.
The standard approach to investigate systematic treatment effect heterogeneity in
many settings is to use specifications that include the subgroup of interest indicator
and an interaction term of the treatment indicator with that subgroup indicator. This
approach is very convenient because it easily accommodates additional covariates and
their interactions with treatment status, thus holding other observables constant when
testing for differential effects by subgroup.
However, as we discuss in Appendix C and show empirically in Tables A7 and A8, the
simple treatment-subgroup-interaction approach is not generally valid in the RDD setting,
unless the relationship between the outcome and the running variable is the same across
subgroups. While this specification bias can be addressed by allowing for separate slopes
14Audit data is only available for one year prior to 2011.
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by subgroup (i.e. full interaction of the running variable polynomial with the subgroup
indicator), the problem remains that other characteristics may vary systematically across
subgroups, thus making it difficult to interpret differential subgroup impacts. Simply
including these additional covariates and their interaction with the treatment indicator
would lead to the same specification errors discussed above. Another approach is to run
separate RDDs in cells defined by specific covariate combinations, but this runs into weak
instrument and sample size issues (Feir et al., 2016). An intermediary approach is to
include interactions of the covariates with running variable polynomials, but this has not
been formally investigated in the RDD setting as far as we know.15 In practice, RDD
papers that conduct subgroup analyses typically run separate RDDs for given values of
the covariates (Hsu and Shen, 2016) and implicitly or explicitly assume that close to the
cutoff other determinants of outcomes are not correlated with the subgroup of interest
(Becker et al. (2013), assumption 3).
In what follows, we propose a new approach to analyze subgroup effects in RDDs
without having to make additional assumptions . Section 6.3 shows an empirical applica-
tion of this approach with the example mentioned above (comparing entities with high vs.
low pre-treatment auction shares). We also developed a Stata command that implements
a weighted binary subgroup analysis for RDDs, rddsga, which is available for download
in the Stata repository.
Propensity Score Weighting
In order to estimate the differential impact on group Gi = 1 vs Gi = 0 in an RDD
setting while holding other observable characteristics constant, we propose an approach
based on propensity score weighting in the spirit of Abadie (2005). This involves weighting
observations from each subgroup by the inverse of their conditional probabilities to belong
to that subgroup given a set of covariates. Thus, observations from subgroup Gi = 1
with high estimated propensity scores and associated covariate characteristics will be
down-weighted, while those with low estimated scores will be up-weighted, making the
covariates of the weighted Gi = 1 sample more closely resemble the similarly weighted
Gi = 0 subgroup sample. Running the RDD analysis separately within each weighted
15Calonico et al. (2017) aims to clarify the conditions under which adding covariates in the RDD
identifies the average effect of treatment at the cutoff. An earlier version of their paper suggests that
future work could study how the interaction approach might be used to investigate treatment effect
heterogeneity at the cutoff.
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subgroup eliminates potential confounding differences due to other observable factors
that may vary systematically across (unweighted) subgroups. As is the case with any
approach of controlling for observables, propensity score weighting cannot rule out any
unobserved confounding factors.
To estimate the propensity score, we first restrict the sample to observations close
to the cutoff using the same bandwidths as for the main results of the paper. We then
follow the standard approach for propensity score weighting. Estimate a logit model in
order to calculate a predicted probability to belong to subgroup Gi=1 (in our example
the probability of having above-median share of purchases made by direct contracting):
P (Gi = 1|Wi) = e
h(Wi)
1 + eh(Wi)
= P (Wi), (5)
where h(Wi) is a starting specification that includes the covariates Wi as linear or
interaction terms. Restrict the sample to the common propensity score support and
weight observations by the inverse propensity score. Specifically, the weight attached to
the i-th observation is
Gi
p
P (Wi)
+ (1−Gi) 1− p
1− P (Wi) , (6)
where p is the unconditional probability of belonging to subgroup Gi = 1.
Assessing Covariate Imbalance Reduction
After weighting, we can check whether this process removed imbalances in covariates
between the two subgroups of interest by comparing mean differences in the unweighted
and weighted samples. To assess the statistical significance, we use a t-test for individual
coefficients and an F-test for overall balance, as typically done in balance tables. To assess
economic or substantive balance we use standardized mean differences (SMD). To assess
average balance across covariates we take a simple average of the SMDs in absolute terms.
Estimating the RDD by Subgroup
Once we have settled on a propensity score specification that eliminates or strongly reduces
the imbalances of observables between Gi = 0 and Gi = 1, we can proceed to estimate the
differential treatment effect. One aspect to consider before doing so is that the first stage
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(i.e. the degree to which the treatment probability jumps at the cutoff) can be different
for different subgroups. For this reason, it is important to compare the estimated effects
of the actual treatment (in our case, the impact of being audited, i.e. the IV regressions
using Equations (3) and (4)) rather than the reduced form estimates (i.e. the effect of
passing the cutoff). Another caveat is that conventional (robust or clustered) standard
errors do not capture sampling variability coming from the fact that the propensity score
is estimated. To deal with this issue, our Stata command (block) bootstraps standard
errors and confidence intervals.
4.4 Identification Strategy for the Additional Study Audits
In analyzing the additional audits, we run OLS regressions of the number and type of
checks and infractions on whether a purchase was done through auction or direct con-
tracting:
Yic = β0 + β1Auctionic + β2Xic + εic (7)
where Yic is the outcome variable of contract c in entity i, Auctionic is a dummy that
equals 1 when the purchase originates from an auction and 0 when it originates from a
direct contract, and Xic are a number of covariates including the type of product or
service, the month of the purchase, the amount of the purchase, as well as the month of
the audit and the control department responsible for the entity in question. εic is the
error term. Standard errors are clustered at the entity level.
In order to hone in more precisely on the mechanism, we distinguish differential
effects on the creation stage of the contract, where auctions and direct contracting differ
strongly, and the contract execution stage, where there is no reason to believe that, all
else equal, contracts awarded through auctions or direct negations should differ.
5 Results
5.1 RDD Internal Validity Checks
As discussed in Section 4.1, certain assumptions for the validity of the RDD are testable.
First, we conduct a McCrary density test (McCrary, 2008) to analyze whether there is
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bunching of the mass of entities on one side of the cutoff. Then we analyze whether
entities are balanced with respect to the observable characteristics at the cutoff.
Figure 2 shows the results of a McCrary density test in our study sample, entities
with medium level risk in 2011 or 2012 in the ±10 range around the discontinuity cutoff.
The null hypothesis of the McCrary test is that the density of the treatment-determining
variable - in our case the relative importance score - is smooth around the cutoff. The
dashed line estimates the density on either side of the cutoff, while the solid lines provide
a 95% confidence interval. There is no statistical evidence against the null hypothesis
that the density is smooth around the cutoff. This is consistent with the assumption that
there is no manipulation of entities around the cutoff value.
Local random assignment of entities just above vs. just below the cutoff can also
be indirectly tested by examining whether pre-treatment covariates are balanced above
vs. below the cutoff, as shown in Table 2. In this balance table, we test whether there
is a discontinuity for any of the covariates, by running an RDD with the covariates as
an outcome, as in Equation (4). Columns (1) and (4) show comparison means in the ±4
and ±10 range, respectively. Columns (2) and (3) show linear estimates in the ±4 range
without and with controls. Columns (5) and (6) show quadratic estimates in the ±10
range without and with controls.
The pre-treatment covariates include the share of purchases made by auction, direct
contracting and framework agreement and the log (+1) of the total amount purchased
in the two years prior to treatment, a dummy for being audited in the year prior to
treatment and the political affiliation of the entities. While the p-values of the F-tests for
joint significance of all variables do not indicate significant discontinuities at the cutoff,
in one specification there is a pre-treatment outcome which is significantly different from
zero at the 10% level. For this reason, we include specifications with lagged outcomes
as well as lagged values of the other covariates in Table 2 as controls. We also show a
graphical representation over time that confirms that the treatment effect indeed starts
at the time of the treatment.
5.2 RDD First Stage: Effects on the Audit Probability
We now turn to the analysis of whether there is indeed a discontinuity in the audit
probability at the cutoff, i.e. whether there is a significant first stage. Figure 3 presents
18
the first stage results for the pooled estimation sample for the discontinuity of moving from
low to medium relative importance in 2011 and from medium to high relative importance
in 2012.16 The x-axis represents an entity’s normalized relative importance score. In Panel
A, the y-axis shows audit probabilities. In Panel B, the y-axis represents the residual audit
probability after controlling for stratum fixed effects and the control variables. Each dot
represents a two-point wide bin. For example, the first dot to the right of the cutoff
combines all entities with a relative importance score between 0 and 2 points above the
cutoff. Linear and quadratic fitted lines are also included. The graphical evidence suggests
that the probability of being audited increases discontinuously at the threshold.
Table 3 presents these results numerically based on Equation (3). The specifications
include a linear or quadratic spline in entities’ distance to the cutoffs. Columns (1) to (3)
use a bandwidth of ±4 and a linear spline whereas columns (4) to (6) use a bandwidth of
±10 and a quadratic spline with varying inclusion of covariates. Column (7) employs the
optimal bandwidth given by the MSE criterion proposed by Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). Column (8) uses the same bandwidth as in column (7) but with the bias-corrected
RD estimate and robust standard errors proposed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2014). In our preferred specifications, which include stratum fixed effects and control
variables (Columns (3), (6), (7) and (8)), the probability of being audited increases above
the cutoff by 15.8 to 19.3 percentage points. All first stage estimates are statistically
significant at the 5% or 1% level.
5.3 Effects on Purchase Modalities
Having established that there is indeed a significant first stage, we now turn to the anal-
ysis of our main outcome: the impact on procurement modalities. Figure 4 presents
graphical evidence for the impact on the use of auctions and direct contracting. It shows
discontinuities in the shares of the amount bought through auctions and direct contracts.
The x-axis represents the normalized distance from the cutoff in the relative importance
score. In the two figures on the left-hand side, the y-axis represents the share bought
through auctions (Panel A) and direct contracts (Panel C). On the right hand side, the
y-axis represents residuals from a regression of the share of purchases made through auc-
tions (Panel B) and direct contracts (Panel D) on the stratum fixed effects and control
16The separate results for years 2011 and 2012 respectively can be found in Table A1 and Figure A1
in the Appendix.
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variables. The vertical distance between the dots close to the discontinuity represents
the intent-to-treat (or reduced form) effect, i.e. the impact of passing the threshold, and
therefore having a higher audit probability, on the outcomes.
The graphical evidence shows a discontinuous decrease at the cutoff in the share
of purchases made through auctions and an increase in the share made through direct
contracts. The similar magnitudes and opposite directions of the jumps suggest that
entities increase the use of the direct contracts at the expense of auctions.17 Figure A5 in
the Appendix shows no change in the total amount of purchases.
Table 4 displays these results in regression form, following Equation (4). Column
specifications are the same as in Table 3.18 The results are quite robust across the different
specifications, even though the level of significance varies. In the specifications including
the control variables, the estimates of the reduction in the share bought through auctions
range from 6.9 to 8.9 percentage points and the estimates for the increase in the share
of direct contracts range from 6.1 to 7.7 percentage points.19 The IV regression that
combines the first stage with the reduced form shows an impact of being audited of 34 to
41 percentage points for the shift towards direct contracts and 38 to 48 percentage points
for auctions. However, these specific point estimates have to be interpreted with caution
both because the standard errors are large and because the first stage estimates may be
too weak to provide reliable IV estimates due to weak instruments problems.
We also look at how the treatment effect develops over time. Appendix Figure A7
shows quarterly treatment effects for two years before to two years after the beginning of
year t. While the quarterly results are relatively noisy, the effect size seems to increase
over the course of year t and decrease over the course of year t + 1. Table A6 displays
regression results for year t + 1. Although the estimates are again negative for auctions
and positive for direct contracts, they are smaller than in the year of the audit and not
statistically significant. This suggests that the impacts decrease over time. However, this
17Figure A2 in the Appendix shows no apparent discontinuities in the shares of purchases made through
framework agreements or small purchases. Separate figures by year are shown in Figures A3 and A4.
18Table A2 in the Appendix shows the regressions for purchases done through framework agreements
and small purchases. The effects are small and insignificant. Separate estimates for 2011 and 2012 are
shown in Tables A3 and A4 respectively.
19As a robustness check, we calculate these effects including the interaction between stratum dummies
and distance to the cutoff. This allows for the possibility that the relationship between the outcome
and the running variable could be different within each stratum. Figure A6 and Table A5 show these
estimates graphically and in regressions. The results are quite similar (8.3 to 9.5 percentage points for
auctions and 5.6 to 7.2 for direct contracting).
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interpretation has to be made with caution, because the confidence intervals are wide,
and the effects are not statistically significantly different from year t.
Beyond analyzing whether entities use direct contracting or auctions, we can also
analyze the impact on the type of direct contracting used. There are 21 different justifica-
tions or reasons for the use of direct contracting instead of auctions.20 The most frequent
ones are: unique supplier (only one supplier in the market), emergency, purchase is for
less than $720, trust in a particular supplier only, and disproportionate cost of organizing
an auction.
Out of these 21 justifications, the emergency justification is generally known as being
prone to overuse and is for this reason the only one for which the regulation explicitly
stipulates that the head of an entity is personally liable in case of overuse. In part, this
is because it is difficult to monitor ex-post whether some purchases were indeed urgent
and because if a buyer waits long enough, almost any purchase becomes justifiable on
emergency grounds.
Table 5 shows RDD estimates for the shares of purchases made through direct con-
tracts using each of the five most frequent justifications and through any of the other
justifications grouped together. We see that the emergency justification accounts for the
biggest increase in the share of total purchases made. This type of direct contract in-
creased by 4.2 to 4.9 percentage points, from a base share of 0.8 to 1.4 percentage points
significant at the 1% or 5% level. These results suggest that emergency purchases rep-
resent almost half of the aggregate increase in direct contract purchases caused by the
audits. Purchases with unique supplier justifications start at a higher base share of 2.5
percentage points and increase by 1.2 to 1.8 percentage points (only marginally signifi-
cant). The coefficients for the other four categories are close to zero and not statistically
significant. Figure 5 presents graphical evidence of these results. Overall, these results
suggest that the increase in direct contracting is driven to a large degree by the most
flexible emergency justification.
5.4 Effect on Competitiveness
One reason that policy makers tend to promote auctions over direct contracting is that
auctions tend to be more competitive in the sense that a larger number of suppliers
20The 21 justifications coming from Chilean law number 19,886 are listed in Appendix D.
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compete for the contract. However, it is not a priori clear that a move from auctions
towards direct contracting necessarily implies a decrease in the number of bidders. Some
auctions attract only a small number of bidders, and certain types of direct contracts also
require the procurement officer to obtain 3 quotes from different firms.21
In this section, we therefore examine whether the effects described above indeed lead
to a reduction in the number of suppliers involved. In particular, we would like to rule
out that the reduction in auctions comes mainly from auctions with a small number of
bidders, while the increase in direct contracting comes mainly from cases requiring three
quotes, in which case the number of suppliers involved may not actually change even
though we see a reduction in the share of auctions.
Table 6 presents regression results measuring the impact separately on the share of
auctions and direct contracts with high and low number of involved suppliers. Columns
(1) and (2) show the impact on the share of auctions with 3 or fewer bidders and with
more than 3 bidders. The difference between the coefficients of Columns (1) and (2) is not
statistically significant, but if anything, the reduction is larger for auctions with a large
number of bidders. Columns (3) and (4) show the impact on direct contracts that require
1 quote or 3 quotes. Again, the difference between the two is not statistically significant,
but if anything, the effects appear larger for direct contracting that requires only one
quote. Overall, these results show that the shift from auctions to direct contracting
primarily stems from competitive auctions with more than 3 bidders to direct contracting
types such as emergency, which require only one quote.
6 Mechanisms
This section presents evidence on potential mechanisms that might explain the observed
increase in the use of direct contracting and corresponding decrease in the use of auctions.
First, we discuss results from the additional audits that allow for contract-level analysis.
Second, we check whether the audit probability decreases following an audit, which could
have led entities to temporarily relax compliance with procurement regulation. Finally,
we discuss the results of an application of our new approach to conduct subgroup analysis
21The most frequent justifications that require 1 quote are unique supplier, emergency, trust in suppliers
and disproportionate cost. On other hand, the most common justifications that require 3 quotes are:
unsuccessful auction, unfinished contract due to breach of contract from original supplier, contracting
with foreign legal persons and cost of less than 720 USD.
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in an RDD setting, comparing public entities with high vs. low pre-audit shares of direct
contract purchases.
6.1 Auctions Receive More Scrutiny Than Direct Contracts
In order to measure the way in which auditors treat purchases through auctions and direct
contracts, we use data from the additional audits, described in Section 3.2. These audits
were implemented in the same way as standard audits, with the only difference that more
detailed information about the process was collected.
Table 7 presents regression analysis of the number and type of checks and detected
infractions by purchase on whether that purchase was done through auction or direct
contracting. Panel A shows results without controls, and panel B includes purchase-level
controls for the amount of the purchase, the responsible control department (UCE), the
month of the purchase, the product code, and the month of the audit.
Column (1) shows that purchases from auctions were subject to 31 more checks than
purchases from direct contracts, which were only subject to 21 checks. This corresponds
to almost 2.5-times as many checks for auctions. The point estimate remains practically
unchanged when including the controls. Column (4) shows that purchases made through
auctions were marked for 1.6 more infractions without controls, and 2.7 more infractions
with controls, compared to 2.5 detected infractions for purchases made through direct
contracts. Including controls, the probability of an infraction being detected is therefore
twice as high for purchases made through auctions rather than through direct contracts,
holding the size of the purchase, the type of product, etc. constant.
In order to further investigate whether these differences stem indeed from the pur-
chase modality and not from other unobserved differences between the purchases, we
analyze the impact separately for the creation and the execution stage of the contract.
The creation stage of a contract includes everything that precedes contract signing, such
as choosing the procurement modality, writing the specifications for auctions, requesting
quotes for direct contracts, evaluating the bids or offers, etc. This is where auctions and
direct contracting differ the most. The contract execution stage refers to all activities
following contract awarding, such as the timing of delivery, quality of the product or ser-
vice, and whether contract specifications are met. In this stage, all else equal, contracts
awarded through auctions and direct negations are quite similar.
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Looking at Columns (3) and (4), we see that 90% of the higher number of checks for
purchases made through auctions stem indeed from the creation stage. Columns (5) and
(6) show that with regards to the additional detected infractions, without controls over
70% come from the creation stage, and with controls over 80%. The finding that most of
the difference in numbers of checks and infractions occurs in the creation stage suggests
that this is related to the different protocols for auctions and direct contracting, rather
than some unobserved difference between purchases done through the two modalities.
Finally, Column (7) shows the differences by modality in the probability that follow-up
actions for serious infractions are taken. There is no significant effect. This suggests that
the additional detected infractions are not due to serious malpractice, but rather due to
more routine errors. However, even being detected for more routine infractions leads to
significant consequences for the affected entities and the officers in question.22
These findings are consistent with the notion that running an auction mechanically
involves a larger number of steps and complying with a larger number of rules and that
auditors therefore have more steps to audit. Following each step of the regulation in
this legalistic way may result in the unintended consequence of auditing purchases made
by auctions more intensely, implicitly discouraging the use of auctions even though the
government explicitly tries to promote them. On the other hand, it does not seem to be the
case that entities are frequently detected or prosecuted for overuse of direct contracting.
Focusing more on the justification step of the direct contracting process and reducing the
number of checks conducted in routine auditing of auctions could potentially reduce this
implicit disincentive for auctions.
6.2 Audit Risk Does Not Decrease the Following Year
An alternative mechanism could be that public agents relax after being audited because
they think that the auditing selection rule makes it less likely that they will be audited
again in the subsequent year. This mechanism is unlikely to drive the results, for two
reasons.
22Following the audit, the Comptroller Agency issues a report detailing all the infractions of the agency
in question, which is publicly available on the internet. The agency then needs to file a response explaining
how the infractions happened and what they will do to remedy the issue. If the Comptroller Agency is
not satisfied, additional reports are requested. During this process, officials who committed the errors
in question typically need to explain themselves internally to their superiors, and qualitative interviews
suggest that this is usually a painful process that can affect officials career opportunities.
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First, as both procurement officers and auditors told us in a number of qualitative
interviews, even if the audit probability were to temporarily dip in the year following an
audit, that would not leave entities “protected” from scrutiny, as even audits conducted
in later years will still be able to investigate purchases from several years back. So they
told us that it would not be reasonable for agents to expect that their current purchases
would be subject to less scrutiny.
Second, we find that in fact there is no such dip in the audit probability. Table 8
reports the estimates of the impact on the probability of being audited in the year after
the audit.23 Although the results are not statistically significant, if anything, there is a
slightly increase in the probability of being audited in the following year.
6.3 RDD Subgroup Analysis Results
An additional way to shed light on mechanisms is often to conduct subgroup analyses to
investigate whether treatment effects are larger for groups for which one would expect a
larger effect when certain mechanisms are at play. One subgroup of interest in our case
are entities that have a large share of direct contracting in their purchases prior to the
audit. If public entities have a large share of direct contracting, they may be more likely
to learn that overuse of direct contracting is not detected or punished. We analyze this
issue by comparing entities with above-median share of direct contracting in the year
prior to treatment.
However, entities with a high share of direct contracts differ from those with a low
share in other ways. Tables A9 and A10 Columns (1) to (4) show that those with a high
share of purchases made through direct contracting tend to be larger, more likely to have
been previously audited, and more likely to be located in the central region, for example.
(Table A9 shows the ±4 range around the cutoff and Table A10 the ±10 range). We would
like to analyze the differential treatment effect between entities with high versus low shares
of direct contracting while holding other covariates constant. However, as discussed in
Section 4.3, using simple interactions to estimate the different effects by subgroup and to
control for other differences is not generally valid in the RDD setting.24
23Figure A8 shows these results graphically.
24Tables A7 and A8 illustrate the specification bias that would arise in subgroup analyses if we used
simple interaction terms in RDD. Panel A shows the analysis using an interaction term of the dummy
for crossing the threshold with the dummy for having an above-median share of direct contracting in the
pre-treatment year. The coefficients of this specification are clearly very different from the difference in
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We therefore follow the propensity score weighting procedure laid out in Section 4.3.
We start by constructing the propensity score for being in the group with above-median
share of direct contracting in the ±4 and ±10 range. The propensity score is based on the
following covariates: dummies for entity managed by left-wing or right-wing party in t−1
(omitted category is independent party), log (+1) of total amount of purchases in t − 1
and t − 2, dummy for being audited in t − 1, dummy for being a municipal or national
entity (omitted category is regional entities), year dummies and dummies for North and
South of the country (omitted category is Central Region).
Columns (5) to (6) show how covariate balance improves with the inverse propensity
score weighting. In both the ±4 and the ±10 range, the overall P-value for the test of
joint significance of covariates changes from 0.000 to 1.000, and the average standardized
mean difference is reduced from 0.148 to 0.016 in the ±4 range and from 0.162 to 0.005
in the ±10 range. This suggests that when running the RDD separately in each subgroup
after weighting, any differential impact estimates we find are unlikely to be driven by
differences in the characteristics shown in this table. As with any method that controls
for other observable characteristics, this approach cannot rule out remaining differences
in unobserved variables.
Since the first stage may not be identical for both subgroups, differences in the
reduced form estimates (i.e. the impact of crossing the cutoff) between the subgroups
might stem either from a differential treatment effect or from a difference in the strength
of the first stage. To see the differential effect on each subgroup, we therefore run RDD
IV regressions by subgroup as shown in Table 9 (impact of an audit on auction share)
and Table 10 (impact of an audit on share of direct contracts). Panel A shows the results
without weighting, and Panel B shows the results with propensity score weighting, which
equalizes the observable covariates across the subgroups. The estimates of the difference
in treatment effects are shown in row 3 of each panel.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the reduction in the auction share and the increase
in the direct contracting share are larger for those with an above-median share of direct
contracting prior to the intervention. However, the difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. As we can see from Panel B in Table 10, with this sample size it is unlikely that we
would ever find a significant difference between any two subgroups, unless one subgroup
had a large positive and the other a large negative treatment effect.
the treatment effect for the two subgroups found by estimating the RDD separately within each subgroup
in Panel B.
26
In sum, propensity score weighting essentially eliminates originally large covariate
imbalances across these subgroups, allowing us to conduct separate RDD regressions in
each group while holding other observables constant. Being able to do this reveals that
there is no statistically significant difference in the impact between entities with above-
and below-median direct-contracting share in the pre-treatment period.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of audits by the Chilean Comptroller Agency Con-
tralor´ıa on subsequent public procurement practices, using a fuzzy RDD design based on
a scoring rule that Contralor´ıa used in 2011-2012 to allocate its audits. Being audited
causes public entities to shift away from auctions to the less transparent and less com-
petitive modality of direct contracting. This change in behavior goes against the goal
of the Chilean procurement regulation to promote the use of auctions over direct con-
tracting. The increase is particularly strong for direct contracts justified by emergency,
which are notoriously prone for overuse and only require a quote from one firm. On the
other hand, there is a large reduction in auctions with more than 3 bidders so the overall
competitiveness of the procurement process is reduced.
In order to shed light on the potential underlying mechanisms, we worked with the
Comptroller Agency to implement audits aimed at gathering additional data. Results
from these audits show that holding the amount and type of purchase constant, audits
undergo about 2.5 times as many checks as purchases made through direct contracting
and lead to about twice as many detected infractions. The effects hold when controlling
for other characteristics and are concentrated on the creation stage of the procurement
process, where auctions and direct contracting differ the most. Learning that entities do
not seem to get in trouble for overuse of direct contracting but on the contrary, are more
likely to be called out for infractions when using auctions, may discourage procurement
officers from using the already more work-intensive auctions that the government tries to
promote. Overall, these results suggest that it is key not to think of audits merely as
“neutral” verification and information extraction mechanisms, but to carefully consider
potential impacts and incentives created by the audit design.
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Table 1:
Summary Statistics
Panel A: Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Purchase Modality Amount in
Millions of USD
Share of Total
Value of Purchase
Number of Orders Share of Total
Number of Orders
Average Number
of Bidders/Quotes
Auction 3,760 66.06% 2,595,662 51.15% 9.8
Direct contract 973 17.09% 706,016 13.91% 1.8
Framework agreement 938 16.48% 1,416,036 27.90%
Small purchases 21 0.38% 356,901 7.03%
Panel B: Estimation Sample
Auction 2,597 66.58% 1,827,455 52.76% 10.0
Direct contract 675 17.30% 482,816 13.94% 1.7
Framework agreement 613 15.72% 889,745 25.69%
Small purchases 16 0.40% 263,575 7.61%
Notes: The full sample consists of all public entities with medium level of risk (720 and 953 in 2011 and 2012 respectively). The estimation
sample consists of public entities with medium risk whose normalized importance scores for the year in question was within the ±10 range (610
and 392 in 2011 and 2012 respectively). Column (5) shows the average number of bidders in auctions and the average number of required quotes
for direct contracting.
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Table 2:
Balance Test for Pre-Treatment Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Comparison
mean
(±4)
Linear
estimate
(±4)
Linear
estimate
(±4)
Comparison
mean
(±10)
Quadratic
estimate
(±10)
Quadratic
estimate
(±10)
Auctions share, t-1 0.656 -0.007 -0.026 0.695 -0.035 −0.048∗
(0.035) (0.026) (0.035) (0.026)
Direct contracting share, t-1 0.146 0.050 0.023 0.123 0.050 0.036
(0.032) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026)
Framework agreement share, t-1 0.183 -0.044 -0.004 0.168 -0.021 0.004
(0.029) (0.021) (0.030) (0.022)
Log (+1) of total amount purchased, t-1 13.331 0.317 -0.123 13.244 0.096 -0.100
(0.322) (0.128) (0.311) (0.130)
Auctions share, t-2 0.694 0.009 -0.032 0.731 -0.005 -0.056
(0.041) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036)
Direct contracting share, t-2 0.128 0.020 0.004 0.111 0.019 0.025
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029)
Framework agreement share, t-2 0.155 -0.028 0.021 0.138 -0.014 0.024
(0.029) (0.026) (0.028) (0.024)
Log (+1) of total amount purchased, t-2 13.176 0.233 -0.001 13.079 -0.001 -0.096
(0.349) (0.178) (0.339) (0.140)
Audited, t-1 0.187 0.042 0.002 0.163 0.085 0.067
(0.069) (0.055) (0.074) (0.069)
Right-wing 0.671 -0.047 0.107∗ 0.695 -0.092 -0.003
(0.099) (0.056) (0.111) (0.058)
Independent 0.108 0.069 0.011 0.103 0.071 0.049
(0.052) (0.042) (0.057) (0.043)
F-statistic 0.70 1.20 0.84 1.50
[p-value] [0.744] [0.278] [0.596] [0.124]
Notes: This table tests whether there is a discontinuity for any of the covariates, by running an RDD with the covariates as an
outcome, as in Equation (4). Columns (1) and (4) show RDD comparison means in the ±4 and ±10 range. Columns (2) and (3)
show linear estimates in the ±4 range, without controls and with both stratum fixed effects and covariates, respectively. Columns
(5) and (6) display the corresponding quadratic estimates. The covariates include: political affiliation (if appropriate), log (+1) of
total amount purchased one and two years prior to the variable whose balance is being tested, a dummy for having been audited
in the preceding year (audits data is not available for two years earlier) and auction and direct contract share measured one and
two years prior. Standard errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control
department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 3:
Impact on Audit Probability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Audit Probability
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.296∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗ 0.181∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.183∗∗
(0.074) (0.078) (0.069) (0.088) (0.087) (0.084) (0.067) (0.076)
Bandwidth ±4 ±4 ±4 ±10 ±10 ±10 ±6.51 ±6.51
Observations 482 482 477 1,002 1,002 992 716 716
R-squared 0.035 0.311 0.396 0.050 0.276 0.354 0.402 0.402
Comparison mean 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.118 0.118
Spline Linear Linear Linear Quadr. Quadr. Quadr. Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: First stage RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (3). Columns (7) and (8) employ the mean-squared-error-
optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (8) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates and robust
standard errors following Calonico et al. (2014). The control variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased
one and two years prior, a dummy for having been audited in the preceding year (audits data is not available for two years earlier) and
auction and direct contract share measured one and two year prior. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the strata. A stratum
refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 4:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Auctions
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.065 −0.073∗ −0.069∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗
(0.045) (0.043) (0.032) (0.038) (0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.036)
Bandwidth ±4 ±4 ±4 ±10 ±10 ±10 ±5.19 ±5.19
Observations 482 482 477 1,002 1,002 992 604 604
R-squared 0.030 0.350 0.614 0.016 0.257 0.578 0.573 0.573
Comparison mean 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.665 0.665 0.665 0.666 0.666
Panel B: Direct Contracting
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.087∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.028) (0.032) (0.038) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Bandwidth ±4 ±4 ±4 ±10 ±10 ±10 ±5.05 ±5.05
Observations 482 482 477 1,002 1,002 992 593 593
R-squared 0.043 0.221 0.535 0.017 0.114 0.508 0.498 0.498
Comparison mean 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.125 0.125
Spline Linear Linear Linear Quadr. Quadr. Quadr. Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Columns (7) and (8) employ the mean-squared-
error-optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (8) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates and
robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The control variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of
total amount purchased one and two years prior, a dummy for having been audited in the preceding year (audits data is not available
for two years earlier) and auction and direct contract share measured one and two year prior. Standard errors are clustered at the
stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 5:
Share of Purchases through Direct Contracting by Justification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unique Supplier Emergency
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.012 0.013∗ 0.015∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
R-squared 0.468 0.395 0.413 0.413 0.297 0.204 0.269 0.269
Comparison mean 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.014 0.008 0.014 0.014
Observations 477 992 573 573 477 992 528 528
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±4.85 ±4.85 ±4 ±10 ±4.49 ±4.49
Trust in Suppliers Disproportionate Cost
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R-squared 0.513 0.442 0.427 0.427 0.299 0.271 0.323 0.323
Comparison mean 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
Observations 477 992 976 976 477 992 843 843
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±9.67 ±9.67 ±4 ±10 ±7.96 ±7.96
Cost Less than 720 USD Other
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.009 0.023 0.018 0.020
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.019)
R-squared 0.638 0.542 0.638 0.638 0.676 0.560 0.617 0.617
Comparison mean 0.017 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.062 0.045 0.043 0.043
Observations 477 992 470 470 477 992 722 722
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±3.92 ±3.92 ±4 ±10 ±6.58 ±6.58
Spline Linear Quadr. Linear Linear Linear Quadr. Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Columns (3) and (7) employ the
mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Columns (4) and (8) in addition
reports bias-corrected estimates and robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The control
variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased one and two years prior, and the outcome measured
one and two years prior. Standard errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year,
responsible control department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 6:
Share of Purchases Made through Auctions and Direct Contracting
by Number of Suppliers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Auctions Direct contracting
Bidders≤3 Bidders> 3 1 Quote 3 Quotes
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.040 −0.074∗∗∗ 0.045∗ 0.027
(0.033) (0.027) (0.025) (0.021)
Bandwidth ±7.87 ±5.14 ±6.34 ±5.48
Observations 831 602 699 631
R-squared 0.431 0.308 0.497 0.332
Comparison mean 0.358 0.239 0.118 0.026
Spline Linear Linear Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Mean-squared-error-optimal band-
width following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) with bias-corrected estimates and robust standard
errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The control variables include political
affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased one and two years prior, a dummy for having been au-
dited in the preceding year (audits data is not available for two years earlier) and outcome measured
one and two year prior. Standard errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a
cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 7:
Additional Audits: Checks and Infractions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Checks Infractions Follow-up
Total Creation Execution Total Creation Execution
Panel A: Without Control Variables
Auction 31.31∗∗∗ 28.29∗∗∗ 3.45∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ -0.085
(2.43) (1.90) (0.67) (0.53) (0.45) (0.22) (0.132)
Constant 20.94∗∗∗ 7.33∗∗∗ 11.58∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗
(2.03) (1.32) (0.50) (0.58) (0.42) (0.16) (0.143)
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
R-squared 0.643 0.757 0.166 0.041 0.058 0.066 0.006
Panel B: With Control Variable
Auction 31.81∗∗∗ 28.54∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗ 2.67∗∗ 2.27∗∗ 0.46 0.110
(2.21) (1.69) (0.95) (1.15) (0.82) (0.40) (0.133)
Amount of purchase Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
UCE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of purchase Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product code Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dummy for September audit Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
R-squared 0.921 0.933 0.691 0.726 0.752 0.462 0.578
Notes: OLS estimations. Each observation is an audited purchase. Column (1) shows the total number of checks conducted. Columns
(2) and (3) show the number of checks in the creation and execution stages of the purchase, respectively. Column (4) shows the total
number of infractions detected. Columns (5) and (6) show the number of infractions in the creation and execution stages. Column
(7) shows the probability of a follow-up action for serious infractions. Panel B has one less observation since control variables were
missing for that purchase. Standard errors are clustered at the entity level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 8:
Impact on the Audit Probability in the Subsequent Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of Audit in t+1
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.041 0.078 0.089 0.079
(0.114) (0.105) (0.079) (0.098)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±7.38 ±7.38
Observations 482 1,002 796 796
R-squared 0.361 0.266 0.274 0.274
Comparison mean 0.162 0.161 0.176 0.176
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (3). Columns (3) and (4) em-
ploy the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
Column (4) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates and robust standard errors following
Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). The control variables include political affiliation, log
(+1) of total amount purchased one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one year
prior (audits data not available for two years before treatment). Standard errors are clustered
at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department
and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 9:
Auction Share by Pre-Treatment Share of Direct Contracting
(RDD IV Estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Nonweighted
Audit × 1{DC share > p(50)} -0.479 -0.486 -0.641
(1.734) (12.535) (66.950)
Audit × 1{DC share < p(50)} 0.008 -0.314 -0.260
(19.240) (1.779) (5.136)
Difference Estimate -0.487 -0.173 -0.381
(19.306) (12.849) (66.296)
Observations 477 992 604
Panel B: Propensity Score Weighted
Audit × 1{DC share > p(50)} -0.442 -0.443 -0.581
(29.813) (2.455) (3.454)
Audit × 1{DC share < p(50)} 0.155 -0.199 -0.185
(1.768) (2.726) (3.054)
Difference Estimate -0.597 -0.244 -0.396
(30.231) (3.668) (5.010)
Observations 471 990 600
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.19
Spline Linear Quadr. Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: RDD IV estimations. Column (3) employs the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Panel B was obtained using equations (5) and (6).
The control variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased one and two
years prior, a dummy for having been audited in the preceding year (audits data is not available
for two years earlier) and auction and direct contract share measured one and two year prior.
Standard errors are bootstrapped. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control
department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 10:
Direct Contracting Share by Pre-Treatment Share of Direct Contracting
(RDD IV Estimates)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Nonweighted
Audit × 1{DC share > p(50)} 0.408 0.467 0.541
(2.117) (1.079) (11.875)
Audit × 1{DC share < p(50)} -0.010 0.033 0.034
(7.875) (5.714) (1.348)
Difference Estimate 0.418 0.434 0.507
(8.135) (5.713) (11.954)
Observations 477 992 593
Panel B: Propensity Score Weighted
Audit × 1{DC share > p(50)} 0.389 0.424 0.486
(2.543) (0.718) (16.141)
Audit × 1{DC share < p(50)} -0.251 -0.014 -0.078
(2.439) (4.891) (0.773)
Difference Estimate 0.640 0.438 0.564
(3.217) (4.935) (16.196)
Observations 471 990 591
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.05
Spline Linear Quadr. Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: RDD IV estimations. Column (3) employs the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Panel B was obtained using equations (5) and (6).
The control variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased one and two
years prior, a dummy for having been audited in the preceding year (audits data is not available
for two years earlier) and auction and direct contract share measured one and two year prior.
Standard errors are bootstrapped. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control
department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Figure 2:
McCrary Density Test
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Notes: Dashed line indicates density estimate, and solid lines show the 95% confidence interval. The
analysis includes the pooled sample of entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative
importance score. Relative importance scores are normalized by stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers
to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity.
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Figure 3:
Audit Probability (First Stage)
(a) Audit Probability
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Notes: The figures show the audit probability for entities with medium level of risk in the
±10 range of the relative importance score. In panel (a), the dots represent audit probabilities
averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panel (b) the dots
represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the dummy for
having been audited in the year corresponding to the score on stratum fixed effects and control
variables. Control variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased one
and two years prior, a dummy for having been audited in the preceding year (audits data is
not available for two years earlier) and auction and direct contract share measured one and two
years prior. Relative importance scores are normalized by stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers
to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. Solid lines show
linear and quadratic fits.
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Figure 4:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting
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(b) Residual Auctions Share
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Distance to cutoff
(c) Direct Contracting Share
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(d) Residual Direct Contracting Share
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Notes: The figures show the amounts purchased through auctions and direct contracting as shares of total purchases, for
entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance score. In panels (a) and (c), the dots represent
modality shares averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panels (b) and (d), the dots
represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the outcome (amount purchased through a given
modality over total amount purchased) in the year corresponding to the score on stratum fixed effects and control variables.
Control variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased one and two years prior, a dummy for having
been audited in the preceding year (audits data is not available for two years earlier) and auction and direct contract share
measured one and two years prior. The relative importance score for each entity is normalized by the stratum-level cutoff. A
stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. Solid lines show linear and quadratic
fits.
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Figure 5:
Share of Purchases by Justifications for Direct Contracting
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Notes: The figures show the amounts purchased through each justification of direct contracting as
shares of total purchases, for entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative
importance score. In panels (a) and (c), the dots represent justification shares averaged within 2-
point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panels (b) and (d), the dots represent averaged
residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the outcome (amount purchased through
a given justification over total amount purchased) in the year corresponding to the score on stratum
fixed effects and control variables. Control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount
purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two years prior. The
relative importance score for each entity is normalized by the stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers to
a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. Solid lines show linear and
quadratic fits.
45
A Appendix Tables and Figures
Table A1:
Audit Probability (First Stage) by Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2011
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.101 0.104 0.099 0.098
(0.067) (0.079) (0.075) (0.087)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±4.99 ±4.99
Observations 321 610 392 392
R-squared 0.310 0.307 0.307 0.307
Comparison mean 0.075 0.040 0.092 0.092
Panel B: 2012
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.395∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗
(0.164) (0.154) (0.128) (0.147)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.72 ±5.72
Observations 161 392 222 222
R-squared 0.439 0.352 0.383 0.383
Comparison mean 0.278 0.214 0.260 0.260
Spline Linear Quadr. Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (3). Standard errors are clustered
at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by each combination of responsible
control department and type of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log
of total amount purchased one and two years prior, and a dummy for having been audited in
the preceding year (audits data is not available for two years before treatment). For 2011, the
analysis focuses on the cutoff between low and medium levels of relative importance, while for
2012, it focuses on the cutoff between medium and high importance. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
46
Table A2:
Share of Purchases through Framework Agreements and as Small Purchases
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Framework Agreement
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.004 0.012 0.009 0.009
(0.026) (0.025) (0.019) (0.024)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±7.32 ±7.32
Observations 477 992 784 784
R-squared 0.656 0.615 0.604 0.604
Comparison mean 0.212 0.210 0.190 0.190
Panel B: Small Purchases
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±8.86 ±8.86
Observations 477 992 915 915
R-squared 0.624 0.663 0.657 0.657
Comparison mean 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.014
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Standard
errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible
control department and type of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log of
total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two
years prior. Columns (3) and (4) the employ mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (4) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates
and robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table A3:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting in 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Auctions
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} −0.086∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.072∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.035) (0.042)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.33 ±5.33
Observations 317 602 404 404
R-squared 0.630 0.598 0.567 0.567
Comparison mean 0.630 0.639 0.668 0.668
Panel B: Direct Contracting
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.082∗ 0.061 0.054∗∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.044) (0.039) (0.024) (0.029)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.80 ±5.80
Observations 317 602 432 432
R-squared 0.389 0.331 0.485 0.485
Comparison mean 0.139 0.131 0.123 0.123
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Standard
errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible
control department and type of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log of
total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two
years prior. Columns (3) and (4) employ the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (4) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates
and robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table A4:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting in 2012
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Auctions
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.016 -0.086 −0.135∗ −0.161∗
(0.057) (0.066) (0.073) (0.087)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±4.11 ±4.11
Observations 160 390 162 162
R-squared 0.635 0.582 0.625 0.625
Comparison mean 0.658 0.709 0.668 0.668
Panel B: Direct Contracting
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.062 0.113 0.109∗ 0.127∗
(0.050) (0.071) (0.058) (0.069)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±4.83 ±4.83
Observations 160 390 195 195
R-squared 0.391 0.334 0.551 0.551
Comparison mean 0.132 0.092 0.137 0.137
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Standard
errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible
control department and type of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log of
total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two
years prior. Columns (3) and (4) employ the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (4) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates
and robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table A5:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracts
Interacting the Running Variable with Stratum Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Auctions
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.065 −0.092∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.033) (0.038) (0.037) (0.029) (0.028) (0.034)
Bandwidth ±4 ±4 ±4 ±10 ±10 ±10 ±5.16 ±5.16
Observations 482 482 477 1,002 1,002 992 603 603
R-squared 0.030 0.456 0.675 0.016 0.329 0.628 0.630 0.630
Comparison mean 0.637 0.637 0.637 0.665 0.665 0.665 0.668 0.668
Panel B: Direct Contracting
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.087∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.039) (0.027) (0.032) (0.041) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027)
Bandwidth ±4 ±4 ±4 ±10 ±10 ±10 ±5.30 ±5.30
Observations 482 482 477 1,002 1,002 992 615 615
R-squared 0.043 0.367 0.604 0.017 0.183 0.576 0.575 0.575
Comparison mean 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.117 0.117
Spline Linear Linear Linear Quadr. Quadr. Quadr. Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4) and additionally interacting each stratum dummy with
the distance to the cutoff. Columns (7) and (8) employ the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012). Column (8) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates and robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2014). The control variables include political affiliation, log (+1) of total amount purchased one and two years prior, a dummy for
having been audited in the preceding year (audits data is not available for two years earlier) and auction and direct contract share
measured one and two year prior. Standard errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year,
responsible control department and type of entity. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table A6:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting in Subsequent Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Auctions in t+1
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.039 -0.048 -0.041 -0.052
(0.037) (0.035) (0.031) (0.036)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.54 ±5.54
Observations 476 990 634 634
R-squared 0.543 0.493 0.478 0.478
Comparison mean 0.605 0.620 0.627 0.627
Panel B: Direct Contracting in t+1
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.018 0.031 0.025 0.029
(0.030) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±6.27 ±6.27
Observations 476 990 697 697
R-squared 0.512 0.428 0.442 0.442
Comparison mean 0.168 0.159 0.143 0.143
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Standard
errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible
control department and type of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log of
total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two
years prior. Columns (3) and (4) employ the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (4) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates
and robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table A7:
Specification Bias in Subgroup Analysis with Interaction Terms in RDD:
Auctions
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Estimation with Interaction Term
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} -0.048 −0.080∗∗∗ -0.038
(0.038) (0.030) (0.031)
1{RI ≥ cutoff} × 1{DC > p(50)} -0.030 -0.008 -0.032
(0.040) (0.026) (0.035)
Sum of estimates -0.079 −0.088∗∗ -0.070
(0.055) (0.039) (0.047)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.43
Observations 477 992 630
R-squared 0.607 0.576 0.560
Panel B: Separate Estimation
1{RI ≥ cutoff} × 1{DC share > p(50)} −0.129∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗ −0.103∗∗
(0.042) (0.045) (0.043)
1{RI ≥ cutoff} × 1{DC share < p(50)} -0.004 -0.045 -0.043
(0.061) (0.052) (0.042)
Difference Estimate -0.125 -0.069 -0.060
(0.085) (0.077) (0.060)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.43
Observations 477 992 630
R-squared 0.666 0.624 0.608
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Standard errors are clustered at
the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type
of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased +1 one and
two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two years prior. Column (3) employs the mean-
squared-error-optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
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Table A8:
Specification Bias in Subgroup Analysis with Interaction Terms in RDD:
Direct Contracting
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Estimation with Interaction Term
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.036 0.066∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.025) (0.025) (0.019)
1{RI ≥ cutoff} × 1{DC > p(50)} 0.066∗∗∗ 0.012 0.040∗∗
(0.025) (0.016) (0.020)
Sum of estimates 0.102∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗
(0.036) (0.029) (0.027)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.29
Observations 477 992 615
R-squared 0.446 0.507 0.510
Panel B: Separate Estimation
1{RI ≥ cutoff} × 1{DC share > p(50)} 0.113∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.092∗∗
(0.045) (0.042) (0.040)
1{RI ≥ cutoff} × 1{DC share < p(50)} 0.002 0.003 0.027
(0.026) (0.025) (0.029)
Difference Estimate 0.111∗∗ 0.105∗ 0.065
(0.054) (0.053) (0.049)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±5.29
Observations 477 992 615
R-squared 0.597 0.580 0.563
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Standard errors are clustered at
the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type
of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased +1 one and
two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two years prior. Column (3) employs the mean-
squared-error-optimal bandwidth following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). ***p<0.01, **p<0.05,
*p<0.1.
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Table A9:
Balance Improvement: Sample in ±4 Range around the Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Original Balance Balance after Propensity Score-Weighting
Low
share
High
share
Low
share
High
share
(n=243) (n=237) (n=234) (n=237)
Mean Mean St.mean
differ-
ence
P-value Mean Mean St.mean
differ-
ence
P-value
Dummy(independent) 0.173 0.135 0.105 0.252 0.150 0.154 -0.011 0.904
Dummy(left-wing) 0.222 0.232 -0.023 0.797 0.221 0.221 -0.001 0.992
Dummy(right-wing) 0.605 0.633 -0.058 0.529 0.629 0.624 0.009 0.921
Log (+1) of total amount in t-1 13.272 13.914 -0.385 0.000 13.686 13.622 0.039 0.674
Log (+1) of total amount in t-2 12.955 13.853 -0.463 0.000 13.581 13.507 0.047 0.617
Dummy(audited in t-1) 0.148 0.295 -0.355 0.000 0.231 0.226 0.012 0.895
Dummy(municipal entity) 0.564 0.519 0.090 0.326 0.528 0.527 0.003 0.975
Dummy(national entity) 0.128 0.148 -0.058 0.523 0.126 0.136 -0.028 0.755
Dummy(regional entity) 0.309 0.333 -0.053 0.563 0.346 0.337 0.018 0.850
Dummy(2012) 0.362 0.304 0.124 0.176 0.335 0.338 -0.006 0.948
Dummy(2011) 0.638 0.696 -0.124 0.176 0.665 0.662 0.006 0.948
Dummy(Central Region) 0.576 0.624 -0.099 0.281 0.582 0.585 -0.006 0.950
Dummy(North) 0.156 0.110 0.137 0.133 0.134 0.139 -0.016 0.862
Dummy(South) 0.267 0.266 0.004 0.967 0.284 0.276 0.019 0.840
Abs(Standardized mean diff.) 0.148 0.016
F-statistic for joint significance 4.429 0.047
P-value for joint significance 0.000 1.000
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) show the mean of each variable for entities with below-median share of purchases made through
direct contracting. Columns (2) and (6) show the means for entities with above-median shares of direct contracts. Columns (3)
and (7) show the standardized mean differences. Columns (4) and (8) show the p-values of t-tests for statistical significance of
the difference in means between the two groups. Propensity score-weighted statistics are based on equations (5) and (6).
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Table A10:
Balance Improvement: Sample in ±10 Range around the Cutoff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Original Balance Balance after Propensity Score-Weighting
Low
share
High
share
Low
share
High
share
(n=478) (n=520) (n=471) (n=519)
Mean Mean St.mean
differ-
ence
P-value Mean Mean St.mean
differ-
ence
P-value
Dummy(independent) 0.180 0.137 0.119 0.060 0.152 0.154 -0.006 0.922
Dummy(left-wing) 0.230 0.200 0.073 0.247 0.213 0.215 -0.007 0.915
Dummy(right-wing) 0.590 0.663 -0.152 0.016 0.635 0.630 0.010 0.870
Log (+1) of total amount in t-1 13.464 13.933 -0.273 0.000 13.748 13.736 0.007 0.917
Log (+1) of total amount in t-2 13.155 13.819 -0.335 0.000 13.612 13.593 0.011 0.861
Dummy(audited in t-1) 0.186 0.308 -0.281 0.000 0.249 0.251 -0.003 0.966
Dummy(municipal entity) 0.579 0.481 0.198 0.002 0.519 0.521 -0.004 0.947
Dummy(national entity) 0.142 0.204 -0.162 0.010 0.178 0.177 0.002 0.976
Dummy(regional entity) 0.278 0.315 -0.081 0.200 0.304 0.302 0.003 0.963
Dummy(2012) 0.410 0.375 0.072 0.258 0.398 0.396 0.005 0.940
Dummy(2011) 0.590 0.625 -0.072 0.258 0.602 0.604 -0.005 0.940
Dummy(Central Region) 0.571 0.665 -0.194 0.002 0.618 0.617 0.001 0.984
Dummy(North) 0.138 0.096 0.131 0.039 0.119 0.120 -0.003 0.962
Dummy(South) 0.291 0.238 0.119 0.061 0.263 0.263 0.001 0.990
Abs(Standardized mean diff.) 0.162 0.005
F-statistic for joint significance 6.437 0.010
P-value for joint significance 0.000 1.000
Notes: Columns (1) and (5) show the mean of each variable for entities with below-median share of purchases made through
direct contracting. Columns (2) and (6) show the means for entities with above-median shares of direct contracts. Columns (3)
and (7) show the standardized mean differences. Columns (4) and (8) show the p-values of t-tests for statistical significance of
the difference in means between the two groups. Propensity score-weighted statistics are based on equations (5) and (6).
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Table A11:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting
Municipalities Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Auctions
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} −0.091∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.024) (0.032) (0.038)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±3.73 ±3.73
Observations 257 522 243 243
R-squared 0.422 0.548 0.440 0.440
Comparison mean 0.758 0.776 0.764 0.764
Panel B: Direct Contracting
1{Relative importance ≥ cutoff} 0.082∗∗ 0.060 0.075∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.025) (0.029)
Bandwidth ±4 ±10 ±4.24 ±4.24
Observations 257 522 277 277
R-squared 0.379 0.348 0.443 0.443
Comparison mean 0.097 0.087 0.098 0.098
Spline Linear Quadratic Linear Linear
Stratum fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Reduced form RDD estimates following the specification of Equation (4). Standard
errors are clustered at the stratum level. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible
control department and type of entity. The control variables include political affiliation, log of
total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two
years prior. Columns (3) and (4) employ the mean-squared-error-optimal bandwidth following
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). Column (4) in addition reports bias-corrected estimates
and robust standard errors following Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014). ***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Figure A1:
Audit Probability (First Stage) by Year
(a) Audit Probability, 2011
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(b) Residual Audit Probability, 2011
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(c) Audit Probability, 2012
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(d) Residual Audit Probability, 2012
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Notes: The figures show the audit probability for entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance
score. In panels (a) and (c), the dots represent audit probabilities within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance
score. In panels (b) and (d), the dots represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the dummy
for having been audited in the year corresponding to the score on stratum fixed effects and control variables. Control variables
include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and a dummy for having been audited
in the preceding year (audits data are not available for two years earlier). Relative importance scores are normalized by
stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers to a cell defined by each combination of responsible control department and type of
entity. Solid lines show linear and quadratic fits.
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Figure A2:
Share of Purchases through Framework Agreements and as Small Purchases
(a) Framework Agreement Share
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(b) Residual Framework Agreement Share
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(c) Small Purchases Share
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(d) Residual Small Purchases Share
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Notes: The figures show the amount purchased through framework agreement and the amount of small purchases as shares
of total purchases, for entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance score (reduced form). In
panels (a) and (c), the dots represent modality shares averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score.
In panels (b) and (d), the dots represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the outcome
(amount purchased through a given modality over total amount purchased) in the year corresponding to the score on stratum
fixed effects and control variables. Control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased +1 one and two
years prior, and the outcome measured one and two years prior. The relative importance score for each entity is normalized
by the stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. Solid
lines show linear and quadratic fits.
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Figure A3:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting in 2011
(a) Auctions Share
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(b) Residual Auctions Share
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(c) Direct Contracting Share
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(d) Residual Direct Contracting Share
−
.
3
−
.
1
5
0
.
1
5
.
3
R
e
s
i
d
u
a
l
−10 −8 −6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Distance to cutoff
Notes: The figures show the amounts purchased through auctions and direct contracting as shares of total purchases, for
entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance score. In panels (a) and (c), the dots represent
modality shares averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panels (b) and (d), the dots
represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the outcome (amount purchased through a given
modality over total amount purchased) in the year corresponding to the score on stratum fixed effects and control variables.
Control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome
measured one and two years prior. The relative importance score for each entity is normalized by the stratum-level cutoff. A
stratum refers to a cell defined by each combination of responsible control department and type of entity. Solid lines show
linear and quadratic fits.
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Figure A4:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting in 2012
(a) Auctions Share
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(b) Residual Auctions Share
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(c) Direct Contracting Share
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(d) Residual Direct Contracting Share
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Notes: The figures show the amounts purchased through auctions and direct contracting as shares of total purchases, for
entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance score. In panels (a) and (c), the dots represent
modality shares averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panels (b) and (d), the dots
represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the outcome (amount purchased through a given
modality over total amount purchased) in the year corresponding to the score on stratum fixed effects and control variables.
Control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased +1 one and two years prior, and the outcome
measured one and two years prior. The relative importance score for each entity is normalized by the stratum-level cutoff. A
stratum refers to a cell defined by each combination of responsible control department and type of entity. Solid lines show
linear and quadratic fits.
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Figure A5:
Total amount purchased
(a) Total Amount
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Notes: The figures show the total amount purchased in logarithm, for entities with medium
level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance score. The relative importance score for
each entity is normalized by the stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year,
responsible control department and type of entity. In panel (a), the dots represent modality
shares averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panel (b), the
dots represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the Outcome
(total amount purchased) in the year corresponding to the score on stratum fixed effects and
control variables. Control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased
+1 one and two years prior and the outcome measured one and two years prior. Solid lines show
linear and quadratic fits.
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Figure A6:
Share of Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting
Interacting the Running Variable with Stratum Dummies
(a) Auctions Share
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(b) Residual Auctions Share
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(c) Direct Cntracting Share
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(d) Residual Direct Contracting Share
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Notes: The figures show the amounts purchased through auctions and direct contracting as shares of total purchases, for
entities with medium level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance score (reduced form). In panels (a) and (c),
the dots represent modality shares averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panels (b) and
(d), the dots represent averaged residuals. The residuals are obtained from a regression of the outcome (amount purchased
through a given modality over total amount purchased) in the year corresponding to the score on stratum fixed effects, and
their interaction with running variable, and control variables. Control variables include political affiliation, log of total amount
purchased one and two years prior, and the outcome measured one and two years prior. The relative importance score for each
entity is normalized by the stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers to a cell defined by each combination of responsible control
department and type of entity. Solid lines show linear and quadratic fits.
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Figure A7: Treatment Effects on Purchases through Auctions and Direct Contracting over Time
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Notes: The lines show the estimates for the impact on the share of purchases made through auctions and direct contracting by
quarter. Coefficients plotted correspond to the bias-corrected estimates using the MSE-optimal bandwidth. Zero corresponds
to the first year.
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Figure A8:
Audit Probability (First Stage) in Subsequent Year
(a) Audit Probability in t+1
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(b) Residual Audit Probability in t+1
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Notes: The figures show the audit probability in the year after treatment. In panel (a), the dots represent audit probabilities
averaged within 2-point-wide intervals of the relative importance score. In panel (b), the dots represent averaged residuals.
The residuals are obtained from a regression of the outcome on stratum fixed effects and control variables. Control variables
include political affiliation, log of total amount purchased one and two years prior, and a dummy for having been audited in
the year prior to treatment year (audits data is not available for two prior to treatment). Analysis for entities with medium
level of risk in the ±10 range of the relative importance score. The relative importance score for each entity is normalized by
the stratum-level cutoff. A stratum refers to a cell defined by year, responsible control department and type of entity. Solid
lines show linear and quadratic fits.
64
B Audit Protocol
Goal Specific audit check Type
Auctions
1) Auction Call
1. Verify the existence of the mayoral (municipality) decree or resolution that ap-
proves the auction call.
Creation
2. Check the publication of the auction in the ChileCompra system. Creation
3. Verify the existence of technical and administrative tender documents. Creation
4. Verify that the tender documents are approved by mayoral decree or resolution. Creation
2) Verify that the call
contains the minimums
established in art. 24 of
Regulation N◦250
Verify that the call has at least:
1. Description of the good or service. Creation
2. Name of the contracting entity. Creation
3. Modalities and dates for the clarification of tender documents. Creation
4. Date and time of receipt and opening of bids. Creation
5. Amount and type of required guarantees. Creation
6. Full name and email of the officer in charge of the procurement process. Creation
3) Verify that the bases
contain at least the
aspects referred to in
art. 20 and 22 of
Regulation N◦250
Verify that the bases establish at least:
1. The requirements and conditions to be met by bidders. Creation
2. The generic specification of goods or services to be procured. Creation
3. The stages and deadlines for bidding and contracting. Creation
4. The conditions, time and way of payment of the good or service contracted. Creation
5. The deadline for the delivery of the good or service. Creation
6. The nature and amount of guarantees, as well as how and when they will be
restored.
Creation
7. The means to establish whether the supplier has outstanding balances with
employees and dates by which they will be requested.
Creation
8. The designation of the evaluation committee. Creation
4) Analyze the tender
documents and check
whether they favor a
given provider
Evaluate the tender documents and verify that they do not contain any features
that favor a given provider, such as: technical conditions that only one provider can
accomplish or tailored evaluation criteria.
Creation
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5) Presentation of the
bids
Verify that the submission of bids is done according to what is stated in the tender
document:
1. That they contain all the required documents, such as technical and administra-
tive bids.
Creation
2. Validate the guarantee of seriousness of the offer in terms of amount, dates and
validity.
Creation
3. That bid was presented within the deadline established. Creation
4. That they are available in the ChileCompra system. Creation
6) Bid opening report
and evaluation of bids
1. Verify that the following is accomplished:
a. Existence of a bid opening report. Creation
b. Bid opening report is signed by the evaluation committee. Creation
c. Verify that the deadlines (date and time) for the opening of technical bids as
stipulated in the tender documents are met.
Creation
d. Verify that the deadlines (date and time) for the opening of economic bids as
stipulated in the tender documents are met.
Creation
2. Check the following:
a. The existence of an evaluation report of the bids. Creation
b. Check in the evaluation report that the designation of members of the evaluation
committee is done according to the tender document.
Creation
c. Check that the evaluation report is endorsed by all the members of the committee. Creation
3. Validate that the criteria used for selecting the winning bid are consistent with
the tender document.
Creation
4. Verify that the awarded provider presents the best offer according to the param-
eters set out in the tender document.
Creation
7) Committee for
auctions greater than
1.000 UTM
1. Verify the existence of a committee for auctions higher than 1.000 UTM. Creation
2. Verify that the administration has a mechanism for verifying that members of
the evaluation committee do not present conflicts of interest.
Creation
3. Verify that the administration evaluates the financial situation and technical
suitability of hired committee members.
Creation
4. Check the suitability of the members of the evaluation committee in terms of
their professional qualifications or position in relation to the nature of the tender.
Creation
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8) Verify the existence
of the declaration of
kinship of providers
1. Verify that the administration has a control mechanism to prevent people linked
by kinship with senior officials of the entity to be hired.
Creation
2. Verify that the administration evaluates the financial position and technical
expertise of hired personnel.
Creation
3. Verify that the administration has a procedure to verify that it has not hired peo-
ple convicted for anti-union practices or for violating fundamental rights of workers.
Creation
9) Awarding and
contract signing
1. Verify the existence of an award decision duly signed by the committee. Creation
2. Verify the existence of a mayoral decree or resolution that approves the award
decision duly signed by the competent authority.
Creation
3. Verify that the award decision is published in the ChileCompra system. Creation
4. Check that the contract is signed by the date specified in the tender documents. Creation
5. Check that the contract is published in the ChileCompra system. Creation
6. Verify that the contract is approved by a mayoral decree or resolution (if appli-
cable).
Creation
7. Verify that the contract does not apply retroactively. Creation
10) Verify the correct
emission of the
purchase order
1. Corroborate that the purchase order has been issued after the resolution approv-
ing the contract.
Execution
2. Corroborate that the purchase order matches its description with the requirements
and provisions stipulated in the contract and/or tender documents.
Execution
11) Contract extension
Identify and analyze the pertinence of consecutive extensions of contract whose
validity is extended indefinitely.
Execution
12) Verify the
existence, custody,
validity and accounting
registry of performance
guarantees
1. Verify the existence and corresponding custody of the performance guarantee. Execution
2. Verify the following: Execution
a. Amount
b. Name of beneficiary
c. Emission date
d. Validity
e. Delivery
3. Verify that, when appropriate, the guarantee was actually used. Execution
4. Corroborate that the performance guarantees are registered in the accounting
system according to CGR regulation.
Neither
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Direct Contracting
13) Direct purchases of
less than 3 UTM
1. Validate the respective quotation process. Creation
2. Verify the emission of the corresponding purchase order. Execution
3. Verify that the purchase order was issued after the resolution. Execution
4. Check the emission of the corresponding resolution. Creation
14) Purchases or
contracts exceeding 3
UTM and less than 100
UTM
1. Verify that the procurement process and contracts have been developed within
the ChileCompra platform, except for cases under art. 53 of the regulation.
Creation
2. Confirm that the reports, documents and resolutions are published. Creation
3. Verify the resolution authorizing the direct contracting. Creation
4. Verify the reasons for using this exceptional type of contract. Creation
5. Check that the contracts have been formalized by the respective purchase order
in accordance with art. 63 of the regulation.
Execution
6. Verify that the purchase orders are issued prior to receiving the invoice. Execution
7. Determine the existence of at least 3 quotations as required by art. 51. Creation
15) Purchases or
contracts higher than
100 UTM and lower
than 1000 UTM
1. Determine that the procurement process and contracts have been developed
within the ChileCompra platform, except for cases under art. 53 of the regulation.
Creation
2. Confirm that the reports, documents and resolutions are published. Creation
3. Verify sufficient accreditation of elements that allow for direct contracting. Creation
4. Verify the existence of a resolution authorizing the direct contracting. Creation
5. Verify that the resolution explains the reasons for resorting to direct contracting. Creation
6. Check that the contract has been formalized by signature. Creation
7. Determine the existence of at least 3 quotations as established in art. 51. Creation
Overall Checks
16) Procurement plan Verify the existence of a procurement plan and its publication:
1. Verify the existence of a purchasing plan. Neither
2. Verify that the purchase plan has been approved and published. Neither
3. If there are changes to the plan, verify that they are published as well. Neither
17) Review of the
payment decrees or
resolutions.
Validate the following:
1. Verify that the amounts paid correspond exactly to what was offered and con-
tracted.
Execution
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2. Confirm that the decrees or resolutions are duly endorsed by the corresponding
authority.
Execution
3. Verify that the expense vouchers record date and signature of the person with-
drawing the check.
Execution
4. Confirm that the payment decree authorizes the operation. Execution
5. Check that the decrees or resolutions of payments have the relevant supporting
documentation, including at least: purchase order, invoice, document issued by
authorized officer certifying the correct reception of the good or service.
Execution
6. Verify that the payment in question corresponds to a pertinent expenditure. Execution
7. Verify that the payments were made within the prescribed period, checking that
there is no delay between the date of the invoice, its accounting and the respective
payment.
Execution
18) The acquisition or
provision of service
should be according to
the tender documents
and the defined need.
1. Verify that goods and/or services correspond to the effectively auctioned and
contracted (technical specifications).
Execution
2. Verify compliance with the terms of the contract. Execution
3. Check if there are changes to the contracts and their adequate formalization. Execution
4. Check, when applicable, whether penalties for late delivery of goods or services,
partial delivery, technical specification or other (detailing ”others”) were applied.
Execution
5. Verify that the amount of penalties charged is according to what is established
in the tender documents.
Execution
6. Verify that services are adequately provided. Execution
19) Control of
purchased goods
1. Confirm that the goods acquired have been received. Execution
2. Verify that the good acquired is registered in inventory. Execution
3. Verify that the goods are in the respective departments and appropriately used. Execution
20) Aspects of internal
control
1. Existence of a regulation/purchasing procedures manual approved and published
in the system.
Neither
2. Verify that users of the ChileCompra system are formally appointed. Neither
3. Verify that documents are endorsed by those who are authorized (including
delegation of signature).
Neither
4. Corroborate that the administration maintains adequate segregation of duties
between the officials who are involved in the different stages of the procurement
process.
Neither
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C Specification Bias with a Single Binary Subgroup
Interaction Term
This Appendix shows that the simple treatment-subgroup-interaction approach is not
generally valid in the RDD setting, unless the relationship between the outcome and
the running variable is the same across subgroups. And even when the model allows
for separate slopes by subgroup (i.e. full interaction of the running variable polynomial
with the subgroup indicator), the problem remains that other characteristics may vary
systematically across subgroups.
When trying to estimate the differential impact on two subgroups, Gi = 0 and Gi = 1,
there are now two estimands of interest, corresponding to the RD-gaps in Y at the cutoff
in each of the two subgroups:
lim
Xi↓0
E[Yi|Xi, Gi = 0]− lim
Xi↑0
E[Yi|Xi, Gi = 0] = αR0 − αL0 (C1)
and
lim
Xi↓0
E[Yi|Xi, Gi = 1]− lim
Xi↑0
E[Yi|Xi, Gi = 1] = αR1 − αL1 (C2)
Now consider a linear spline specification, augmented only with the subgroup dummy
Gi and an interaction term of the subgroup dummy with treatment assignment Zi ×Gi,
where Zi = I[Xi ≥ 0]:
Yi = αL0 + (αR0 − αL0)Zi + (αL1 − αL0)Gi + [(αR1 − αL1)− (αR0 − αL0)]Zi ×Gi
+ β1Xi + β2Xi × Zi + Ui (C3)
To see the correspondence between the regression specification (C3) and the parameters of
interest (the αs), simply evaluate the predicted value of the estimated regression function
at a given point. For example, when X, Z, and G are all zero, the predicted value
is the estimated mean of Y in the Gi = 0 subgroup just before crossing the cutoff,
i.e. αˆL0. Just above the cutoff, the estimated mean of Y in the Gi = 0 subgroup is
αˆL0 + (αˆR0 − αˆL0) = αˆR0.
Figure C1 illustrates the specification bias that is introduced when both true RD gaps
are zero (αR0 = αL0 = αR1 = αL1, i.e. the treatment has no effect in either subgroup) yet
the relationship between Y and X is not the same in the two subgroups (i.e. different slope
in each subgroup). The two solid lines show the linear approximations to the conditional
expectation functions in the two subgroups, E[Yi|Xi, Gi = 0] and E[Yi|Xi, Gi = 1] within
a neighborhood h around the cutoff. The dashed lines represent the slope estimates from
equation (C3), which are allowed to differ to the left and to the right of the cutoff but
are assumed constant across subgroups. Crucially, the slope estimates are necessarily
between the true slope parameters because OLS tries to minimize deviations from the
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regression line across subgroups. Now as long as the slope estimates are biased, the
intercept and discontinuity estimates at the cutoff are necessarily biased as well. In
Figure C1, the discontinuity estimate for the Gi = 1 subgroup is upward biased and for
the Gi = 0 subgroup the discontinuity estimate is downward biased. This specification
bias is easily fixed if the model allows for separate slopes by subgroup (i.e. a linear spline
fully interacted with Gi):
Yi = αL0 + (αR0 − αL0)Zi + (αL1 − αL0)Gi + [(αR1 − αL1)− (αR0 − αL0)]Zi ×Gi
+ β1Xi + β2Xi × Zi + β3Xi × Gi + β4Xi × Zi × Gi + Ui (C4)
The problem remains, however, that other characteristics may vary systematically across
subgroups, which makes it difficult to interpret differential subgroup impacts.
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Figure C1:
Specification bias
Notes: This figure illustrates the specification bias that arises when the true RD gaps in both
subgroups are zero and the slope parameters of the running variable and the outcome are different
across subgroups, yet the model imposes that the slope parameters are the same.
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D Justifications for Direct Purchases
There are 21 justifications for direct purchases according to Chilean law number 19,886:
1. Acquisition originated in an unsuccessful private auction, where no bidders showed up
(point 1)
2. Remnant of unfinished contract due to breach of contract from original supplier or other
causes, when remnant does not exceed 70,000 USD (point 2)
3. Emergency or unforeseen urgency (point 3)
4. There is only one supplier of goods or services (point 4)
5. Contracting with foreign legal persons outside the national territory (point 5)
6. Confidential services (point 6)
7. Extension of utility contracts or ancillary services (point 7.a)
8. Procurement under representation expenses (point 7.b)
9. Hiring a specific supplier for the safety and integrity of authorities (point 7.c)
10. Hiring of consultancy services, considering the special qualities of the provider (point 7.d)
11. Contracting with holders of intellectual or industrial property (point 7.e)
12. Trust and security of providers, derived from their experience (point 7.f)
13. Replacing or complementing compatible accessories for models already acquired (point
7.g)
14. Public awareness of the tender could jeopardize the goal of the contract (point 7.h)
15. Procurement of goods to foreign suppliers for use outside the country (point 7.i)
16. Purchase is below 7,000 USD and cost of evaluating bids is disproportionate (point 7.j)
17. Goods or services for teaching or research projects (point 7.k)
18. Public auction without prior public tender offers, or inadmissible deals (point 7.l)
19. Specialized services below 70,000 USD as specified by article 107 of the present law [law
number 19,886] (point 7.m)
20. Acquisition of less than or equal to 700 USD (point 8)
21. Exceptions for being required to operate in the online procurement system apply as spec-
ified in article 62 [of law number 19,886]
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